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Burton Weisbrod's  1964  seminal  article  on  option  value  spawned a
large  literature which addresses  the  following question:  will an  individual
who  is  uncertain about his  or  her  future  demand  for  a good  be willing  to
pay  a premium, in excess  of  the  expected value  of use,  for the  right  to
retain the  option  of  future use?  This  difference between maximum  sure
willingness-to-pay  for the  option of  future use  (option price) and  the
expected value of  future  use  (the mathematical  expectation  of  Hicksian
consumer surplus)  is  option value.
It  generally  is  conceded  that when preferences  are uncertain,  option
value can  be positive or negative  (Smith, 1983,  and  Bishop,  1982,  provide
overviews  of  this  literature).  These  results  are  of  dubious  theoretical
interest,  but  of  some  practical  importance.
They are  of dubious  theoretical interest  because,  given current
institutions, the  option price  is  the  correct ex-ante  measure of  welfare
change under uncertainty  (Anderson,  1979).  If  compensation  for  a  change
in  regime  could  be  exacted ex-post,  after uncertainty  was  resolved,  then
the  expectation of  Hicksian equivalent variation would  be  an appropriate
ex-ante  measure of welfare change.  Alternatively,  if  contingent  claims
markets exist,  then the expected  value  of  equivalent  variation again is
appropriate  (Graham, 1981).  However,  neither contingent  claims  markets
nor  the  ability to determine  ex-post compensation  exist.  Therefore,  it  may-2-
be concluded  that option price  is  relevant to  measuring welfare changes under
uncertainty and  expected consumer surplus is irrelevant.  Why then should we
study  option value?
The answer to this  good question is  that  the sign and  size  of  option
value  is  of  considerable practical importance in  project  analysis.  Individual
option prices  may be  assessed  (perhaps) by  contingent  valuation techniques,  but
these analyses are  quite expensive  to undertake.  One-way tests  for project
acceptance based on expected  surplus would be available  if the  sign of  option
value  is  determinate.  For, if  a project  passed  (failed) a benefit-cost  test
which uses expected surplus measures  and it  is  known  that  option  value always
is  positive  (negative),  then the  project  could be  accepted  (rejected).
Naturally, this  approach leaves a zone  of  indeterminancy, which may be
filled only  if  the magnitude  of  option value  is  known.  As well,  if the  issue
is  the optimal  size of  a project, then  the magnitude of  option value, and
not  just  its  sign, must  be known.  Of  course,  this  is equivalent  to  saying
that you  need  to know option price.  This  has  led some  investigators  (Freeman,
1984,  and  Smith, 1984)  to  seek a bound  for option  value.  Unfortunately, useful
analytical  results along these lines  have  been difficult  to  obtain.
Most  of  the option value literature has  dealt with Weisbrod's  original
notion of demand uncertainty.  The difficulty  that  arises in  establishing
a sign for  option value is  the  need to  compare  the marginal utility of  income
across  states:  with different utility  functions  in each state, nothing
definite  can be  said in  this regard.  This  realization led Bishop  (1982)  to
consider  supply-side options.  That  is,  if  demand for  a resource  is  certain
but  its  supply is  uncertain,  then the  problem of  state-dependent marginal
utility of  income is  eliminated and  the sign  of  option value  can be  established.
Freeman (1985) has  pointed out  that  Bishop  only studied  one  case  of  supply-side-3-
uncertainty  and concluded  that  in  the other  cases,  option value  again is
indeterminate.
The assumption of  the  supply-side analyses  that  demand  is certain, but
supply is  not,  seems  relevant  to many current resource policy  issues.  As
well, based on the positive analytical results  obtained by  Bishop  (1982),
more work along these  lines  appears warranted.  In  this  paper,  supply-side
option value is  investigated.
In the  option value  literature, analyses  most  often have been  based on
static models  and have used  the common  postulate that  individual preferences
satisfy  the von Neumann-Morganstern axioms  and, hence,  have an  expected  utility
representation.  In these  analyses,  little attention has  been  paid to  under-
lying choices  and constraints.  This  is  natural, given  the well-known  foundations
of  expected utility  analysis.  However, it  is argued  in  this  paper that  this
possibly  has  led to  a misrepresentation of  actual  choice situations  of  interest
in policy  discussions.
In particular,  it  seems  that  inadequate  attention has  been paid  to
temporal aspects  of  the risky  choices  at  issue,  and  the  timing  of  possible
solutions of uncertainty  relative to  the  time when choices  must be  made.
Consideration of  temporal risk  (in the sense  of Dreze and Modigliani,  1972)
undermines  the expected utility foundation on which previous  research has
been based.  Since most,  if  not  all,  actual  choices  involve  temporal  risk,
this appears  to be  a serious  problem.
The issue  of  time  sequencing has  been raised  in the  option value  litera-
ture  in the guise  of  quasi-option value  (Arrow and Fisher,  1974).  Here,  the
central  issue is  the timing of  choices  relative  to  the timing of  resolution
of uncertainty.  Specifically, Arrow and Fisher and  others  (see Henry, 1974;
Epstein, 1980;  Hanemann, 1983;  and Graham-Tomasi,  1983)  seek  to  determine if-4-
the  prospect  of  learning reduces the  benefits  of  implementing irreversible
investments relative  to  the  case when  learning is  ignored.  The general result
is  that,  even under risk neutrality,  there is  a benefit  to maintaining  flexi-
bility  (a quasi-option value  of  not  undertaking irreversible  investment-)
due  to  expected learning  possibilities.  In  fact,  Conrad  (1981)  suggests  that
quasi-option value is  equal  to  the  expected  value of  information.  Here,  I
very  briefly address quasi-option value  (QOV)(Smith, 1983  calls  this  time-
sequenced option value)  and  its  relationship  to  the  time  sequenced  approach
taken here.
The paper is  organized  as  follows.  In  the  next  two  sections, a  certainty
model is  used  to establish  what  one wishes  to  measure  in.the  stochastic
case and  how  these  measureLments  can  be  used  to select  a project.  Section  2
addresses  individual welfare  change measures,  while Section  3 provides  a
review of  how a planner could  use  information  on  individual welfare  change
to  choose  a project.  In  Section  4, possible  sources  of  uncertainty  are
discussed.  Section  5 contains  an  analysis  of  supply-side option  value
in  a setting where  there  is  no  temporal  risk and  individuals have  standard
von Neumann-Morganstern utility functions.  I provide  an  alternative approach
to  that  used  by Bishop  (1982)  and Freeman  (1985)  and  am able to  obtain  some
positive results.  In  the  sixth section,  the problems  introduced by  a move
to  temporal  risk  is  studied  and  several  results  from  this  literature  are
derived in  terms  of  supply-side uncertainty.  The  results  here are  quite
negative:  temporal  risk  greatly  complicates  the study  of option  value.  The
next  section shows  in  the  case  of  uncertainty  how  the  planner  could  use
individual welfare  change  measures  to  select  a project.  This  section  also
addresses quasi-option  value.  The final  section provides a discussion  and
points  out  some  empirical implications.-5-
It  should  be  stressed  at  the  outset  that  this  paper  is  exploratory  in
nature.  It  represents an  attempt  to  draw  inferences  from  the  general economic
literature on  temporal risk  for  the  modeling of  option  prices  and  option
values  in  the  analysis  of  projects with uncertain  environmental consequences.
There remains  a great  deal  of work  to  be  done.  I seek  here  to  illustrate  the
kinds  of difficult  questions  that  arise  when  time  is  composed with  uncertainty
in  the  study of welfare change and  project  appraisal.-6-
2.  A Certainty Model:  The Individual
In  this  section, a simple model  of  a project  in a dynamic setting  and
measures of welfare change are  set  out.  This will serve  as a foundation
for  the  stochastic models  to be  analyzed in  the  sequel.  It  also has  some
important  implications  for  project analysis which  carry through  to  the  sto-
chastic case and,  therefore,  to  the study  of  dynamic option prices.
The individual has  preferences over alternative sequences  of  goods  con-
sumed and environmental quality.  Let  ct  En  (Euclidean n-space)  be a vector of
consumption goods at  date  t.  Included  in ct are  labor supplies  (measured as
negative) as well as  visits  to recreation areas.  Let  c =  (cl,  ... , cT) be  a
sequence of  such  consumptions;  the individual's  time horizon is  date T.  Prices
of  consumption  goods are  given by  the  spot  price vector pt e E . This  includes
the  prices of  visits  to  recreation areas.
The  level of  environmental quality  at various  locations  at  date  t is
given by  a vector qt  e Em.  This  vector  is  exogenous to  the individual.  How-
ever, as  the  individual has  preferences over alternative quality vectors,
these have components measured  in an  "individual payoff-relevant"  fashion.
The vector qt  will depend on  the  "output" of  a "project"  that  is  being
anticipated.  A project  is  represented by  a sequence of  points on  the  real
line v = (vl,  ... vT)  which may  be  thought of  a "project size."  Of  course,
the  project may outlive  the  individual;  generally T * T.  Often, a project
is  represented  in the  literature  by
vt  0 if  the project  is  not  implemented  all t
1 if  the project  is  implemented
But  this  is  not  necessary and  the  more  general approach allows alternative
"phasings"  of projects,  which may  be  important under uncertainty.-7-
The project  affects payoff-relevant  environmental quality variables
via  a biological/physical process  function.  Thus, a project  may  affect  fish
populations  of  relevance  to  recreationists by  controlling amounts  of  a pollu-
tant which  is  detrimental  to ecosystem functioning more  generally.  In  a
dynamic model,  the  history of  outputs  of  a project,  as  well  as  the  history
of  environmental quality will  affect  current  enviornmental quality.  This  can
be  captured  by  specifying a difference equation which governs  the  time  path
of  environmental quality which does  not  have  a Markovian structure.  Let
t  =  (V1'  V2'  *' '  Vt-)
qt  q  '  q  '  . t-l he
Then
qt+l 
= f(vt'  vt'  St'  qt
)- (1)
Regarding  individual preerences,  it  is  assumed  that  all  individuals
are  finite-lived.  Let  zt =  (Ct,  qt) he  a consumption goods/environmental
quality bundle  at  date  t  (z t e  En x Em)  and  let  z  =  (z  ... ,  ZT).  For
notational  convenience, let  nT mT
notational convenience,  let  =  E  x E  . The  following axioms  concerning
individual  behavior  are  posited  to  hold.
Axiom  1.1:  Each individual's  choices  from  Z are
represented  by  a binary relation  R
on  Z where R is  a weak order  and R  is
monotonic.
Axiom  1.Z:  Let i  be  the  usual  topology  on Z.  Then
{z:  z £  Z, z R y}  e  C  and {z:  z E  Z,
y R  z}  E  E  for every  z, y e Z.
The  following representation theorem is  well known.-8-
Theorem 1.1:  If  individual preference orderings  satisfy
axioms  1.1-1.2,  then  there exists  a real-
valued utility  function U(z),  continuous
in the usual topology  on Z, such  that
z R y iff  U(z)  > U(y).
Proof:  Fishburn (1970)  theorems  3.1,  3.5,  and Lemma 5.1.
Let a E  (0,1) be  the  (constant for  convenience)  one-period, market  rate
of  interest at which individuals  can borrow  and  lend.  The  individual has  an
exogenous  sequence on non-wage  incomes {w}t . Then the  budget  constraint may  be
written
Tn  t=T  t  Tt=T  t-
B(pT,w,a) = {C  E  T  E  T :  a  . c  <  n  t  w ; c e  C }
t=l  t=l
nT
T =  t-l  ) and  C  E  is  the  set  of  feasible
where p  = (P'  ...,  pT),  w = a  wt
consumptions, assumed closed  and bounded  below.
It  is natural to  impose the  following assumptions:
Al:  B(.)  is  non-empty.
A2:  {wt}  is  bounded.
nT
It  is  clear that B(.)  is  compact  in E  .
Let
TT  T  T
V(pT,q  ,w,a)  sup  {U(z)  : c e  B(p  ,w,a)},
c
where q  = (ql,  ... , qT).  Since U is  continuous  and B is  compact  and non-
empty,  the supremum is  attained.
In a world of  certainty, we can  define measures of welfare change  using
T  T
this  intertemporal indirect utility function.  Let  (po,qo)  be  the initial
situation and  let  (pv,qv) be  the situation subsequent to  implementation of  a
project v.  The  compensating variation  (cv)  and equivalent variation  (ev) are-9-
defined  implicitly by  (suppressing a)
T  T  T  cv)
V(p  ,qo,w)  = V(pv,  v  w-cv)  (1)
T  T  T  T  T
V(P,  qv, w) = V(Po, qo, w+ev).  (2)
An important  special case  of  this  arises when the utility function  U is
separable.  Here, I impose  more structure  on preferences  by means  of  the
following axiom.
Axiom  1.3:  (z : z e  Z, z R y) and  (z : z  e Z, y R z)
both are open  in  the usual topology on  Z
(continuity) and are  convex.
To discuss separability and  the existence of  instantaneous  utility
functions,  reconsider the  sequence z.  Recall z  e  En x Em;  z is con-
structed by  considering  the  T-fold Cartesian product  of  En+m with itself
T and with  z  an element of  this  space.  Now,  consider preferences
on each zt individually.  Thus,  let  Z =  tl Zt  where  (Zt, St)  is  a
topological  space for  each t.  Let  H  = it  t be  the product  topology  for Z.
It  is  well known  that  if  each  (Zt,  t) is  a connected and  separable  space,
then  (Z,  i) is  connected  and  separable  in  the product  topology.  Therefore,
it  makes  sense  to discuss properties of  the  instantaneous  utility functions
which are  similar to  those of  the  overall  utility function discussed above.
Let-t = (Z  '  t-1  zt+l'  "  zT) be  the  consumption/quality
bundle at  all dates  other  than date  t.  For fixed  z_t  = Z  0t  the  preference
ordering R induces  a preference ordering on Zt given  by  xt R  x'  if  and
-t
only  if  (xt xt)  R (x_t,  x')  for any  xt,  x'I  in Zt.-10-
Axiom  1.4:  For  each  t  e  (1, ... ,  T)  x t R  x  t
-t
implies  xt R  x  x'  for  all  x_t  e  I  Z..
-t  i*  t
The  following  theorem  provides  a  utility  function  representation  for
separable  preferences.
Theorem  1.2:  The  preference  ordering  posited  in  Axioms  1.1
to  1.4  may  be  represented  by  a  continuous,
quasi-concave  function  U:  I  Zt + E  which
t
may  be  written
U(z
T)  =  (u(z),  ... ,  T(ZT))
where  u  :  Zt + E  and  :  E  +  E, and
TJ as  well  as  each  u t is  increasing,  continuous
(in  the  product  topology  and  usual  topologies
respectively)  and  quasi-concave.
Proof:  The  existence  of  a  continuous  utility  function
taking  the  separable  form  is  proved  by
Katzner  (1970).  That  the  component  functions
U  and  u  are  quasi-concave  if  U  is  (which  follows
from  axloln  1.3),  is  shown  by  Blackorby,  et  al.,
(1978),  Theorem  4.1.
Let  yt  be  income  allocated  to  consumption  at  date  t,  and  let  Bt(t,y t )
=
(c:  pt . ct 




V(pt,q,w)  =  max  {fJ({V(Pt,qtwt)}  ):  a  t  < 
{wt}  t=  t  t=l
The  instantaneous  indirect  utility  functions  can  be  used  to  define  instantan-
eouc  measures  of  welfare  change,  i.e.,-11-
V  (p o
0 q
0 w
0 )  =  V  V) V  Vt  t  t  t  -
Vt(pttw  )  =  Vt(Pt,q  +  evt,  wt),  for  t  E  [O,T].
Here,  when  the  project  is  implemented,  the  consumer  may  respond  by  reallocating
income  through  time  as  well.  This  point  is  crucial,  for  it  creates  the  follow-
ing  inequality:
T ~~~T  T  V  ~v  t  =1' V(p  - ,  qv  - cv,cv  ) 
t=O
t=T  t  =T
V(pv,q,  I  at  (w t - cv)  = V(p  ,q,W-  aC  cv  ).
t=1  t=1
This  implies,  since  V is  increasing in  its  second  arguenrent,  that
t-l cv >  t a 
tcv
Thus,  if the  present  value  of  consumer  surplus  is  non-negative,  so  is  the
present  value welfare change  measure  cv.
Similarly,
t  a  Ievt  > ev,
whence  if  the present value  of  equivalent  variations is  negative, so  is  the
true welfare charge measure.  These  give  two one-way tests,  but  leaves a zone
of  indeterninancy.  Moreover,  we  have  the  following  theorem.
Theorem  1.3:  There  is  no  U with U, 0  and  {ut}  continuous,
increasing,  and  quasi-concave,  such  that  the
present  value  of  instantaneous  cvt or evt is  an
exact  index  of  welfare  change  for  all  projects.
Proof:  Blackorby,  Donaldson  and  Moloney  (1984).
Before  turning  to  an  assessment  of  how  the  equivalent  variation  measure
of welfare  change for  individuals  can  be  used  in  making  choices  among projects
by  a social planner, I  introduce the  intertemporal  expenditure function and
discuss  briefly  the  money  metric  measure  of  welfare  change.-12-
Dual  to  the  lifetime  indirect utility  function introduced above  is  the
lifetime expenditure function  defined  by
T  T  o  T  T  o
V(p  ,  q  ,  w) = V°  <=>  E(p,  q ,  V  ) = w.
The money metric (see McKenzie and  Pearce,  1982)  is  defined  by
Y(v) = E(pT(0),  qT(),  V(pT(v),  qT(v),  w)).
The  definition of  the  expenditure function shows  that
ev(v) = Y(v)  - w.  (2)
The money  metric gives minimum the  cost  of achieving  the  level  of  the utility
with the project, when the  project has  not  been implemented.  Since Y  is  a
monotonic increasing function  of  an indirect utility function,  it  is  itself  an
indirect utility  function.  Importantly, both  the  ev and  the money metric are
invariant  to  increasing monotonic transformations  of  the  underlying ordinal
utility  function.
The money metric and  equivalent variations  possess  an important  property
that  the  compensating  variation does not  have.  The cv  is  not  an  exact measure
of welfare  change  in  that  it  may  not  correctly  rank  several projects  relative
to  a base project,  although  it  will  correctly make pairwise  comparisons
(lause,  1975;  Chipman  and Moore,  1980).
To sum up  the  results  of  this  section, the equivalent  variation and
money metric are useful measures  of  individual welfare  change  due to  the
implementation of  a project.  In  a dynamic  setting,  these  should be  defined-13-
relative  to  the  lifetime  indirect utility  or  expenditure functions.  This
would seem to underscore  the  usefulness of  survey  techniques  in  eliciting
willingness-to-pay  since  lifetime  compensation measures  (or their annualized
equivalent)  can be  directly assessed.  However,  the  lifetime approach does
create a few difficulties  for  the  definition of  an  appropriate  criterion
for  selection of  a project by  the  planning authority.  These  are  addressed,
at  least  partially, in  the  next  section.-14-
3.  Project Selection under Certainty
The difficulties  of moving from individual to  social valuations  of
projects are  of  two kinds.  The first is  the much discussed possibility
of providing an axiomatic  foundation for  a social preference ordering or
welfare  function which  is  based on individual orderings.  This  issue  is
not addressed here;  the existence  of  a preference ordering for  the planning
authority which has  certain properties is  merely  asserted.  The second  diffi-
culty  derives  from the  focus  on lifetime indirect  utility functions in
Section II.  In particular,  if  it  is  asserted that  the  planner has preferences
over indirect utilities, and  it  is  not  assumed  that  each "generation" con-
sists  of  a single  individual  (see,  e.g.,  Ferejohn and Page,  1978),  then  some
work  is  required to establish a benefit-cost  foundation for social  choices.
T  T
The  individual theory above used  the sequences p  and q ,  which are
sequences with terminal date corresponding to  the  individual's  planning
horizon.  These are subsequences  of  pZ  =  (p,,...,pT) and qT  =  (ql,...,qT)
where T  is  the horizon relevant  to  the  planning authority.  These  price
and environmental quality  sequences depend  on  the project  that  is  imple-
mented.  The environmental quality sequence depends  on the project  as  repre-
sented by equation  (1).  In the  sequel q (v) is  used  to  denote this  depen-
dence.  Being purposely vague,  I write p (v) as well.  It  is  assumed  that  both
of  these  functions are unique without specifying conditions  under which this
will be  true.  For t  (T  , r),
q+s+l 
= f((T 
Os ) ' O,  qt+s'  qt+s )
where  s is  the  zero vector in ES. Similarly, let  t = Pt()  for
t  e  (T,  T).-15-
The set  of possible projects  is  given  by ACET, A = {vEET  :  v is
feasible}.  An  individual is  said  to  care about  a project  if  his/her
lifetime indirect utility varies with changes  in v.  Formally, agent  i cares
about the project  set A if V(pT(v),  q (v),  w) t V(pT(v'),  qT(v), w) when
v  v' for some  v, v',  e A.
There are  several ways  in which an individual might  not  care  about  a
project.  If  the  individual  is  not  alive,  then  (presumably) Vi (.) = 0
for  all  v  e  A.  As well,  some  prices  might  not  depend on  the project  and an
individual might not  consume any  of  the  goods  (including recreation) with
project-sensitive prices.  If  Vi is  independent  of  changes  in environmental
quality when consumption of  recreation is  zero and  the  individual  does  not
care about price  changes  for  goods  (s)he does not  consume,  then  (s)he will
not  care about the project.  This  is  the  case of  "weak complimentarity"
discussed in the  valuation literature  (Bradford and Hildebrandt,  1977).
Let Mi = {t  : i cares  about A  at  t},  and  let  t(i)  = inf  {t  : t e  Mi}.
To  avoid mathematical  complexities which are not  of  concern  in this  paper,
the  following assumptions  are  imposed.
A3.1:  The number of  agents  at  each date t is
finite.
A3.2:  T  < A.
A3.3:  t(i)  < T  - Ti for all  i.
Let  I = {i  : t(i)  = t}  and denote the power  of  I by I . Individual  i's
planning horizon is  given  by Ti;  purely  to ease notational  burden, I
assume  that T1 = T for  all i.
The  vector of  lifetime indirect utilities  is  a vector  in  E , where
T
I =  It.  By A3.1  and A3.2,  this  is  a finite-dimensional space.  The planning
t-16-
authority is  presumed  to  have preferences  on E  as  given  in  the following  axioms.
Axiom 3.1:  The  planner's preferences  are  represented
by a binary  relation P  E  x  E  where P
is  a weak order, which  is  monotonic and
continuous in  the  usual topology.
Under axiom 3.1,  P can  be  represented by  a real  valued social welfare  function.
Theorem 3.1:  If  the planner's  preferences satisfy axiom 3.1,
then there exists W  : E  +  ;, with W con-
tinuous and  such  that  W(V  ,...,V  ) > W(V1,...VI)
1  I  -1  -I
if  and  only  if  (V1
...,  V)  P(V  V
Proof:  Fishburn  (1970).
Theorer  3.1  establishes  a social welfare function  defined on  sequences
of  lifetime  indirect  utility profiles.  However,  a problem  arises in  this
approach.  The arguments of  W  are individual utilities, which  can be  sub-
jected to an arbitrary  monotonic transformation with affecting underlying
behavior.  Undertaking such a transformation may drastically  change  the
social  rankings  involved.  Clearly,  this  is  an undesirable  characteristic
for  a social welfare function  to have.  Rather than  dealing  carefully with
specification of W,  it  is  more  convenient  to  measure the  arguments  of  W
such  that  they are  invariant  to such monotonic transformations.  The money
metric described in  the  previous  section is  an obvious  candidate.
Furthermore,  one is  interested in  deriving social  rankings  of  alterna-
tive projects  induced from  this  ranking of utilities.  That  is,  one  seeks  a
ranking P* defined by v P* v'  if  and  only  if  g(v)P  g(v'),  where g:  A +  E
given individual  lifetime utility vectors  as  a function of  projects.  An
important  special  case for which this  is  straightforward and which will  be
useful when uncertainty  is  introduced  is where  the social welfare  function-17-
is  linear.  Thus,  I impose
i=I
A3.4:  W(V1 ,  VI)  =  b
i=l
The implementation of  a project entails a cost  and,  therefore,  the
central planner must  devise some method of  financing the effort.  Assume
that  lump-sum financing  is possible.  Let  the  spot  expenditures  required  to
implement a project v be  given by
k(v)  = (kl(v),  ... , k (v)).
The planner has  several options  for  financing project  v.  A financing scheme
is  a vector of  payments  s(v)  =  (s (v),  ... ,  s (v))  which specifies  si(v),
the payment  by  agent  i to  finance project  v.  The set  of  feasible  financing
schemes  is  given by
t=t  i  i  tiT
S(v)  =  {s(v)  :  X  a 1 s (v) >  a1  kt(v)}
t=l  i=l  t=l
The  central authority will choose  a feasible project/financing scheme
pair so  as  to maximize social welfare.  That  is,  it  will solve
max  ii  b.  Y*i  (v),
veA
where
Y*i(v) =  yi(vs* i (v) ) = Ei(pT(O) qT  (VO))T i i(pT()  (v),w i is*i(v))
for
s*(v) e  argmax Xi  b.Yi(v,s i (v)).
s(v)eS(v) 
It  is interesting  to point out  that  the  following theorem governs a relationship
between choices of  v and choices  of  lifetime  indirect  utility vectors.
Theorem 3.2:  v P* v' if  and only  if
Ji  bi  [evi(v) - evi(v')]  > 0.+  +  +  +  +
Proof:  By  theorem  3.1,  V  P V'  iff  W(V)>W(V'), where V=(V  ,  ... ,  VI).
+  +
Whence by A3.4,  V P V'  iff
Ii  bi  [V  (v) - Vi(0)  - (Vi(v')  - Vi(0))]  >  0.
i  i
Since Y  is  a utility  indicator and yi(0)  =  w
+  +
V  P  V'  iff  Ei  bi[Yi(v) - wi - (yi(v')  - wi)]  > 0,
By definition of  P*  and by  (2),  the  result  follows.
The magnitude of  ev  (v) will depend  on  the financing  scheme  used.  It  is
not  possible  to  separate  these decisions.  McKenzie  (1983,  chapter  8) shows  how,
the  ordinal  properties  of  W  can  be used to  determine losses  due to  use  of  non-
optimal  financing  schemes.-19-
4.  Uncertainty
I now  turn  to possibilities  for generalizing  the  framework developed  in
the  previous  section  to  the  case  of  uncertainty.  As  discussed in  the  introduc-
tion,  it  is  critical that  when uncertainty  is addressed, that  it  is clear what
it  is  that  uncertainty surrounds, who  faces  the uncertainty,  and  what  that  agent
can do  about it.  There  are  several ways  that  uncertainty can  enter  the model
developed  in Section II  of  the  paper.  Here several  are  identified  that  seem
relevant  in the  option  value  literature:
(i)  Ecological uncertainty.  Given  a v e A it  is not known what  level  of
environmental quality will obtain.  This may  be  represented  by  making  (1) a
random function.  There are  two ways  to  capture  this,  each  representing  a dif-
ferent  source  of uncertainty.
First,  one  could think  of  the function  f itself  as  being unknown.  That  is,
one  may not  know  how ecosystem function maps  projects  into environmental quality.
Second,  even  if  the  true  f is  known,  the sequence  of  quality outcomes  might  be
stochastic.  In  fact,  both  of  these  are  operating to  make uncertainty relevant.
If  the  former  operated without  the  latter, a simple  experiment  at  date  zero
would resolve all of  this  type of  uncertainty.  If  the  latter  operated  without
the  former,  then  learning about  ecosystem function would  not  be  possible  unless
it  is  interpreted as  trying to discover  the  probability  law driving  the
stochastic process;  clearly  biological  investigation seeks  more  than  this.
(ii)  Economic uncertainty.  It  seems  plausible  to assume  that  future  prices
and  incomes are  risky.
(iii)  Preference  uncertainty.  The  majority of  the  literature  on  option
value has investigated the  implications  of  state-dependent preferences  (demand-20-
uncertainty) where individual preference orderings  are uncertain.
(iv)  Political/Regulatory uncertainty.  The  project  itself may  be  risky.
The project may entail some  enforcement which may be  applied at  various  levels
in  the future  or may no yield compliance.
(v) Social uncertainty.  When confronted with  a project which  can  be  imple-
mented at  alternative  levels  and where aggregate willingness  to  contribute  to
funding the project  is  involved,  individuals may  hold uncertainty  about  the
contributions  of  other agents.  This often  is  discussed  in  terms  of  strategic
bias  in  contingent  valuation assessments  of  willingness-to-pay where  the  pre-
sumption  is  free-riding behavior, but  this  is  a special  case  of  more  general
problems  of  social  interdependence  in  provision  of  public goods.
(vi)  Planning uncertainty.  Even  if  agents  know their own  preferences,  the
planning  authority may  not know  then.  Thus,  the  planning authority  may  have
uncertainty about preferences  even  if  individuals  do not.
The  theoretical option value  literature has  focused  on uncertainty  of  types
(i),  (ii),  and  (iii)  above,  though  one  analysis  of  time-sequenced option  value
has  examined uncertainty of  type  (iv)  (Grahan-Tomasi,  1985).  The ecological
uncertainty has  taken a particular form  in  the  literature on  supply-side  option
value  (Bishop, Freeman,  1985),  in which quality  either  is  good  enough  to  allow  a
particular  recreational activity or  quality deteriorates  to  the point where  the
activity no  longer is  available.  Thus,  just  two  states are  possible.  It  is
common  in  this literature to  see  this  uncertainty represented as  price  uncer-
tainty, with the  entry  fee  for activity  at  the  rate  equal  to  some  finite  price
of  the  activity  is  available and  an infinite  price  if  it  is  not.  A  generaliza-
tion  of  this  approach  is  presented below.  Usually,  though  not always  (Hartman
and Plummer, Freeman,  1984)  it  is  assumed  that  prices of  other goods  and  income
are non-stochastic.-21-
5.  Individual Uncertainty with an Expected Utility Representation
The majority of  analyses  of  option value employ  a static model and use an
expected utility representation of  individual preferences.  In this  section I
take a similar approach  to modeling preferences  and investigate extensions  of
the  material developed above to  the  case here.  The focus  is  on ecological
uncertainty, that  is,  on supply-side uncertainty.  Given a project,  there  is
a probability structure on  environmental quality  induced  by  the  probability
structure on ecosystem functioning.  To  gain an expected utility  representation,
a static problem is  analyzed.  In section  7 I consider a two-period problem.
Let  (Q,  T,  p  )  be a probability space.  The function  f defined  in  (1) can
be  turned into a random function representing the  two  sources  of  ecological
uncertainty  in  the following fashion.  Let
=  {f:  Em x E x  +  Em:  f if  continuous,
is  Borel measurable  relative to T  for  all  fixed
(g,v) e  E  x E, and p  - integrable}.
Assume
A5.1:  f e  (f,  ...  fF)  fi  for  all  i,
with  ri  =  Prob  [f  =  fi].
Then, the  induced probability measure  on environmental quality,  conditional  on
the project v  and initial  (non-random) enviornmental qualtiy q  is
P  (Q)  =  i P{@  e  Q:  f(qo  v, W) e  Q1}  Q  i
for Q1 e  (Em),  the Borel  sets  of  Em.
In this  section it  is supposed  that  the  individual has preferences  on  the
space  of probability measures on  (Q 1) which satisfy  the non-Newmann  and
Morganstern axioms.  Formally,  let L be  the space of  lotteries  on environmental
qualtiy, i.e.,-22-
L =  {V(Q1)  v  e  A}.
Axiom 5.1:  The individual's  choices from L are  representable
by a binary  relation R which satisfies
(i)  is  a weak order
(ii)  (p1 R  2)  => apl + (1-  a)p3 R ap2 + (1 -a)p3
for p ,  p  ,  n  c L and ac(O,1)
(iii)  ( 1 R p2) and  (P2 R p3)  => apt  + (1 - a)p3  R  p2
and p2  R 81  + (1 - )p  3 for some a, $ e  (0,1)
1  2  3
and p ,  p  ,  n  E  L.
Then one  can show
Theorem 5.1:  For all p ,  v  e  A,  let  the  sets  {ip  e  L:,v R  p° } and
{p  e  L:  po R p}  be open in  the weak  topology  and strictly
convex.  Then there exists a continuous  function
V:  E3n + 2m+l + E such  that
P  R  <=>  IfV(  )d  > f  V(.  )dp° ,
where
sup
V(PO' P1, w, cO,  q,'  q1
) =  C1 E  B(Po' p' 1 w, cO)
U(co' q0 , c1 ,  ql)  for B(.)  =  {cl:  aP 1C1 < w 1 + a  w2}.
Moreover, this  supremum is attained, and
C1 E  arg  max U(-)  is  continuous.
C1 E  B(-)
Proof:  The existence of  the  functions U and V follow from Axiom 5.1
and Fishburn (1970),  Theorem 8.4.  Continuity of V follows  from
openness  of  the upper and lower  contour sets  (Varian,  1978).
That the  supremum is  attained derives from the Weierstrauss
Theorem, the  continuity of U and  the compactness  of  B(*).
Upper semi-continuity  of  c 1 follows from the maximum principle
of Berge  (1963);  but  c1 is  unique due  to  the strict  convexity
of  the upper contour  sets of p, and  therefore cl  is  continuous.
To define welfare measures for  changes  in  the measure pv  due to  choices
of v E  A,  let p° be  the measure  induced by  project 0 E  A.  For further
reference,  let  F°(q,)  and F (ql)  be  the probability distribution functions-23-
for P° and p  . There is  a one-to-one correspondence between p  and F (Ash,
1970).  The compensating option price  (COP)  and equivalent  price  (EOP) are
defined implicitly by
fI  V(p,  q, w - COP(v))dp v = fJ V(p,  q, w)dp°.
fI  V(p,  q, w)dp v = Jf V(p,  q, w + EOP(v))dp.
These, of  course,  are natural analogs  of  the  cv and  ev measures  of welfare
change  defined in Section  II.  In  most  of  the option value literature,  the  COP
measure is  called the  option price  (e.g. Smith,  1983;  Freeman,  1985).  As
discussed in the  introduction, considerable  attention has  focused in  this
literature on  the  relationship  between COP  and the  expected value  of  consumer
surplus.  The motivation for  this  concern  is  two-fold.  First,  in  the absence of
contingent  claims markets,  or  the ability  to extract  ex-post  compensation from
agents,  it  is  thought  that  COP  is  the proper measure  of  ex-ante WTP  for  the  pro-
ject.  Second,  since  consumer surplus measures  are used to  determine  project
choice  (as in Section 3 of  this  paper),  investigators are  interested in
whether use  of  consumer surplus  over or  under  estimates true  ex-ante WTP.
One difficulty with  this  discussion is  that  the  COP measure  only is an
appropriate index of welfare when binary  choices among projects are  being made.
This  is  for the  same reason  that the  cv measure  is  inappropriate.  This  is
stated formally  in the  following theorem.
Theorem 5.2:  The COP(v)  measure  is  not  a valid measure  of welfare
change.
Proof:  Define certainty equivalent environmental quality  levels
CEQ(p, w, co, 1i)  by
f  V(p,  q, w, co,  q)dp  = V(p,  CEQ(-), w, Co)).
Then by definition,
V(p,  CEQ(p, w, co,  i)  w - COP(v),c )) =
V(p, CEQ(p, w, C0 ,  op),  w, C )).-24-
But,  by  arguments  in Chipman and Moore  (1980),  COP(v) only
is  a valid index  for binary  choices.  If  there  is  more  than
one v  e  A  other than v  = U, COP  may not  rank  these  correctly.
In  their analyses  of option  value, Schmalensee  (1972)  and Bishop  (1982)
uses  the EOP.  Of  course, whether EOP  or  COP  is  used will not  matter if  there
are  only  two possible  projects.
As  discussed above,  much  of  the  option  value  literature  is  concerned with
the  relationship  between  an ex-ante measure such  as  COP  or EOP  and  the expected
value  of  ex-post measures.  Freeman  (1985) has  pointed  out  that  the  supply-side
of  many  of  these analyses  is  a special  case  of  the  more general  case  of  a change
in  distribution  that  he  (and I) consider.  In  particular,  these analyses
presume that  only  type  (iii)  uncertainty, demand uncertainty  exists,  substitute
two  degenerate measures p° and pi  on  the  supply  side,  and  let  m =  1.
Briefly,  the formulation  is  as  follows.  Let  V be  the  individual's  indirect
utility function,  a Borel measurable  function  of w  e Q,  and  let pD be  a probabi-
lity measure on the a-algebra on Q.  On  the  supply side,  assure that  Bi  and
p  both are  degenerate, assigning probability  one  to  outcomes  q  and
q  respectively.  Then,  in  state 0,  the equivalent variation ev(0)  is
V  w)(p,  )  V(p,  ,  , w + ev(3)),
and  the  expected  equivalent variation  is
fev(p)dFD(B).
The  following result  has  been  much-discussed.
Theorem  5.3:  With p  and pi  degenerate  and p  non-degenerate,  EOP
can  be  greater or  less  than expected  equivalent
variation.
Proof:  The  proof  follows  that  of  Bishop  (1982),  where our  definition
of  ev is  substituted  for  his.-25-
Note  that  in  the  formulation  in Bishop  and elsewhere  (e.g. Andersen,  1981)
it  is  assumed that  under 0 e  A,  ql  < q1m  where qmin  is  the minimum quality
such that  the  site  is  not  available.  This  is  formalized as  q1  =>  Clj  = 0  where
Clj  is  visits  to  the site  and  is accomplished  by  a pricing function p(v) with
Plj ( U)  =;  Plj ( v)  = Plj  <  -.
The  literature which  addresses ecological uncertainty  in  the  absence  of
preference uncertainty  is  somewhat  confusing regarding definitions  of  equivalent
and  compensating option price.  In  the definitions  above,  equivalent  option
price  (EOP) uses  the situation without  the  project  as  a base  adn asks  how much
money must  be  given  to  the  individual to  forego the  benefits  induced  by  the  pro-
ject.  The  compensating option  price (COP) uses  the situation with  the  project
as  a  base and  asks how  much  can  be  taken  away  from  the individual  to  return
him  or  her  to  the pre-project  level  of  utility.
In  the  analyses by  Bishop (1982)  and Freeman  (1985)  of  ecological uncertainty,
only  two situations  are  compared;  thus,  the difficulty  of  ranking  projects  by
the  COP measure  may  not  arise.  However,  it  is  important  to note  that  the  proof
of Theorem 5.2  used  a certainty equivalent approach.  Iihen  one  defines  a welfare
change  measure  for  each  state,  then which measure  is  appropriate may  depend  on
whether  the  before-project  or after-project  probability measure  is  degenerate.
Both Bishop and Freeman study  a model with only  two  possible outcomes,  one
of which corresponds  to  a level  of quality  such  that  use  of  the  site  is  zero.
They then define the  ex-post compensation  measure  in  the  state  in  which  the
resource is  available by  income  change  that  equates  indirect  utility with  and
without  the  resource.  This is  the  natural  approach.  Here, I  consider a model
with many possible  states.  Thus,  the  ex-post  measure  for  each state  is  defined
relative  to with  and without project  realizations  of  quality.  That  is,  if-26-
q° E  Q  is  the realization without  the project  and qV  Q  is  the  realization
with project v  C  A,  then ev(q  , qV)  and  cv(qV,  qO) are  defined  implicitly  by
(suppressing p)
V(q  ,  w - ev(q ,q  )) = V(q,  w)
V(q° ,  w) = V(q,  w - ev(qv,  q0 ))
In  the most  general situation in  which there is  risk about environmental
quality both with and without  the project.  Then expected values  of  ex-post
welfare measures are  given by
f  f  ev  )Y(q  q  )dF v (qv )dFO(qo) = I  cv(qVqo)dFO(qO)dFV(qV)
Having  chosen a base  outcome given by  the  first argument  of  the  ev(.,.)  and
0  V'  0
cv(.,.)  function  (e.g.,  ev  (qO,  qV)  gives  the ev of  a move  from outcome q°
without the project  to  outcome q  with the  project),  both  of  these will correctly
0
compute  the welfare change in  each state.  That  is,  conditional  on outcome q ,
the L.H.S.  measure will assign the  same welfare measure to  two indifferent with-
V
project  outcomes q . The  same  is  true for  the R.H.S. where  the  conditioning
base event  is  the with-project event q .
Returning to  the analyses  of  Bishop (1982)  and Freeman (1985),  consider
two  special cases.  In the  first,  the situation without the  project  is  risky,
while the project provides a desirable sure outcome,  and  in the  second, environ-
mental quality without the project  is  given  by a sure  undesirable outcome, while
the  project provides a risky quality.  These correspond to Case  B and Case C in
Freeman (1985),  respectively;  he notes  that Bishop  studies Case B.
Consider first Case B.  Here, since  the situation with  the project  is
fixed, it  makes  some sense  to  use  the  cv measure  in  each state.  Then, a fixed
base  is used for comparison to each of  the  risky outcomes without  the project.
It  is  easy to  show that  the COP  is  greater  than the  expected value of  the
ex-post  cv measures,  at  least  for a finite number of  states.-27-
Theorem 5.4:  (Bishop, 1982) Let  F°(q)  be  non-degenerate with
probability mass  o°=  (1°,  ... ,  11I)  and  let FV(q)
v
be  degenerate, with Prob  [q  =  qV]  = 1.  Then, if  V(.)
is  strictly concave  and  increasing in income,  the
COP  is  greater than the expectation of  cv.
Proof:  The cv  measure in state  i is  defined  implicitly by
V(qV,w  - cvi)  =  V(q,w).
Compensating option value  is  defined by
Xi ni V(qi,w)  =  V(qV,w  - COP).
By  concavity  of V(w,q)  in w,
V(q  ,w - cvi)  < V(qV,w - COP) + (COP-cvi)V (qV,w-COP).
Since  the LHS  is  equal  to V(w,q  ) by  definition,
multiplication by HII  gives
0  V(qiw)  <  TIV(qVw-COP)  +  nIo(COP-cvi)V  (qVw-COP). 1  1  1
Summing over i yields
lii  V(qi,w)  <  V(q  ,w-COP)  +  V  (qV,w-COP)[COP-°n icv ].
By the definition of  COP,
0 <  V  (qV,w-COP)[COP-li  cvi], w  ii
which  provides  the  result.
Actually, with many possible  states,  the use of  the  cv  as  the  ex-post  compen-
sation measure and COP  as  the  option price, and  the  definition of  cv  in each
state allows a simpler proof  than that  used  by  Bishop in  the two-state world.
Next,  consider Case C.  Freeman (1985)  uses  a cv measure  and proves  that
the  sign of  option value  (the difference between COP  and the  expectation of  ev)
is  ambiguous.  Here  is presented  a similar result,  and  also  it  is  shown  that
with an equivalent option price approach  and use  of  ev  in  each state,  the  sign
of  option value can  be determined.-28-
Theorem  5.5:  Let F(q)  be  non-degenerate with probability mass
nv  =  (1 , ...  , T), and  let  F°(q)  be degenerate
with Prop  [q=qo]  =  1.  Then, with V increasing
and strictly  concave  in incore,  the relationship
between COP  and  expected cv  is  not determinate.
A  sufficient  condition for  COP - E(ev) to  be
positive  is  that  the marginal  utility income  is
the same  for each  state.
Proof:  The  cv  in  each state  is  defined  by
V(q  ,w-cvi)  =  V(q,w)
and COP  is defined by
iRi  nV(qiw-COP) =  V(q°,w).
By strict  concavity of V in  w,
V(qi,w-cv
i ) < V(q  ,w-COP) +  [COP-cvi]V  (qi,w-COP).
w
<=> V(q°,w)  V(qVi,w-COP)  +  [COP-cv  ]V  (q',w-C(P)
<=> ni V(q°,w) <  nH  V(q  , w- COP)+H
v [CO
P - cv 
]V (ql,w-COP).
This holds  for each  i, whence by  definition  of  COP,
U  < 1i  IIN[COP-cv i ]V  (q  ,w-coP)
The difficulty  in  establishing a sign for  option  value
is  presented by  the marginal  utility  of  incorme.  If
i
this  is  the  sane  at  (w-COP) for  each q ,  then  this
term can  be  factored  out  to  yield
O  <  COP  - i  n  cvi.
The value  of  an equivalent option  price approach  is  that  the marginal  utility of
income  term  appears  only  with  a  fixed  state.  Thus,  equivalent  option  value  is
positive.
Theorem  5.6:  Assume the  conditions of Theorem 5.5.  Then  EOP  is
greater  than  E(ev).
Proof:  The proof  is  exactly  the  same  as  for  the proof  of
i Theorem  5.4  using  EOP  and  ev  defined  by
V(q  ,w-ev ) = V(qi,w)
iV(qi,w) = V(q°,w-EOP).-29-
The discussion of  the  relationship  between the  ex-ante  measures  of  COP  and
EOP  and  the  expected  value  of  ex-post measure  cv  and  ev  is  due  to  a desire  to
determine if  use  of  cv and  ev  in  project  evaluation systematically over or  under
estimates  true  ex-ante WTP.  However,  two  points  may  be  made.  First  and  most
obviously, knowing that  expected ev  underestimates EOP  is  not  particularly  use-
ful  if  you  don't  know  by  how much.  Thus,  Smith  (1984)  tries  to  find  a bound  for
the  size  of  the  discrepancy.  Unfortunately,  Smith's  approach  requires  a  fairly
strong  restriction  on  preferences  and  only works  for two  possible  states.
Second,  most  analyses  of  projects  do  not  use  the  expected  ev or  cv  measure.
Rather, they  ignore uncertainty  altogether and presume  that  the  expected outcome
is  the  true  outcome.  Thus,  they  calculate  the  H{icksian  welfare  measure  at  the
expected  value.  formally,  let
ev(q)  =  ev(fndFv(g))
ev(q ° )  =  ev(fqdF°(q)).
f  ev(  )  > ev(),  then  the  project is  said to  make  the  individal  better  off If  ev(q  )  e  ),  then  the  project  is  said  to  make  the  individual  better  off
and  the analysis  proceeds  as  in  Section  3.  It  may  be  possible  to  derive  an
approximation to EOP  based  on  readily  observable variables  and  the  deterministic
ev  using  expected  values.  The  author  will  present  such  an  approximation  in a
future  paper.-30-
6.  Individual Uncertainty:  Generalized Expected Utility
The model of  the previous  section, which predominates  the option value
literature,  is  static;  this  was  captured in the  previous section by  assuming
that C0 is  fixed and concentrating on  the  relationship between C1 and ql.  As
well,  it  was assumed that C1 could  be  chosen after observing ql.  When  this
assumption is  dropped and  the model becomes dynamic, there are  two difficulties
that arise.
First, atemporal von Neumann-Morganstern  (vN-M) utility  theory  applied
in a dynamic setting requires  that  preferences  on  income  (or here,  environ-
mental quality) be  defined solely on  income vectors.  In  the language  of
dynamic programming, a plan for  choosing actions given states  induces a
probability distribution on the  vector of  payoffs.  As  optimal plan  (if  one
exists)  is  one  that  maximizes  the expectation of  vN-M utility  function on
such vectors.  As  pointed out  by  Kreps  and Porteus  (1978),  this  rules  out
the possibility that  an individual may  prefer earlier  to  later resolution
of  uncertainty.  They illustrate this  by  the  following example.  Suppose
the  payoff vector  is  (5,10) with probability 1/2  and  (5,0) with probability
1/2.  Then under  the vN-M axioms,  since 5 is  the first-period payoff  for
sure,  the individual should  be  indifferent between a flip of  a fair coin
at  t = 0 and a flip  of  the  coin at  t = 1 to determine which vector obtains.
In fact,  individuals may prefer earlier resolution of uncertainty.
Kreps and Porteus  (1978,  1979)  derived a generalization of  atemporal
vN-M theory, which they  called temporal von Neumann-Morganstern utility
theory.  In their theory, uncertainty  is dated by  the time  of  its  resolution.
These entities  are  called temporal lotteries.  They present  axioms  for  prefer-
ences  defined as  these  temporal lotteries which allow a temporal vN-M-31-
representation.  Below,  their framework is  applied to  our  problem concerning
environmental quality.
The second  problem  that  arises  concerns  induced preferences when a
choice must  be made  before uncertainty  resolves.  Even  if  all  uncertainty
resolves  at a single date  and  the  underlying preferences  on  consumption
have  an expected utility representation,  induced  preferences will,  in  general,
not  satisfy the  independence axiom  and will be  "non-linear in  the  probabil-
ities."  This has  been observed by  Mlarkowitz  (1959),  lossin  (1969),  Spence
and  Zeckhauser  (197z),  and  Dreze and  Mlodigliani  (1972).  Kreps  and Porteus
(1979)  derive necessary and  sufficient  conditions  for  induced  preferences
in  the temporal  case  to  take  the  temporal  vN-tM  for;.  These  are quite  strong.
Machina  (1982,  1984)  has  proposed  an  approximation  approach  called  generalized
expected utility  theory, which copes with  this  difficulty without  sacrificing
the  basic foundation  of  expected  utility theory.  In  this  section,  these results
are  developed  in  terms  of  a model of  ecological uncertainty.
Uncertainty is  represented in  same way  as  in  the  previous section.  lJe
assume  that  the  space a  of  possible  realizations  of  the  "experiment"  giving
rise  to environmental uncertainty  is  compact.  Let  ) t be  the  space  of  Borel
probability measures  on Qt.
Lemma  6.1:  Dt is  a compact  metric space.
Proof:  By  assumption,  f is  continuous  function onto
Qt  for  fixed  qt- 1  By Theorem 3.5  in  Kolmogorov and
Fomin (197U),  Qt  is  compact:  0t  E"  so  it  is  a
metric space.  The  result  follows  froi  Parthasarathy
(1967),  Theorem 6.4.
Endow D  with  the weak topology.  If  g(q)  is  continuous,  then the  weak
topology  is  the weakest  topology  for  which  the  functional f  g(x)dp(x)  is-32-
continuous  for pU  D.  Alternatively, one  could  give Dt the  Prohorov metric,
since convergence  in  the  Prohorov distance  of  a sequence  of  measures  on  a
Polish space  is  equivalent  to  weak  convergence  of  this  sequence  (Lukacs,  1975,
p.  74).
Clearly,  the probability measure on  1 is  conditioned on  the  realization
of  q0 due  to  the  strucLure  of  the  function  f.  Thus,  define  D( as  the  space
of  all  Borel  probability  measLres  on  (0 x  U).  Ilerents  of  DO are  called
temporal  lotteris;.  I  introduce  the  following  axioms  on  individual  prefer-
ences  regarding probability measures.
Axiom  . 1:  T'e  relation  R  is  asyrmletric  ;irc
neigatively  transitive.
Axiom  6.2:  The  sets  [jp E  DO : pUK p] and
[pO E  DO : P('  R pU]  are  both  open
in  the  weal  topolory.
Axiom  6.3:  If  p( R  P  nd  a  e  (0,1),  tlheo
iapu (  - a) p']  R  [rap  +  (1 - a) p6i.
Axiom 6.4:  Let Pio be  degenerate with  outcome  (q),pl).
If  (q,pl)  :1- (Ou,p l ) and  a  £  (0,1),  then
[a0 ,  apl  +  (1  - a)  pP  I|,,  al  -r  (I  - a)  p
Axiom  6.1  and  6.2  are  obvious  analogs  of  Axiom  5.1  and  the  condition  of
Tlieorei.  5.  regardinlg  continuity.  *Axior  o.J  is  a  subs t  i ttitltioP  axior  sirilar
to  Axiom  5.2  for  time  zero;  Axiom  6.4  is  a  substitution  axior  for  tire  ].
Ihe folloving  restates  Theorr  2  in  irep:;s  nd  c  )rlcr;s  (l/c7).-33-
Theorem  b.1:  Axioms 6.1  to  6.4  are necessary  and
sufficient  for  these  to  eyist continousl
ruinctions  Vl  :  x'!  X  i  i; !  i  i  L  . '
.. ;7itr  L  ]ipc'resiig  in  its  second  argument
such  that  if V0 : Q0 x D1 + E is given  by
tFi  1el~  p  i, iK p,'  i i;  ,1,!  c''  i' 
r  ,  j  I  )=*'  /  f  '  '  f  i  jo ) 
ri  I
Olen  II  \!  I I
Proof:  Kreps  and  Porteus,  1978,  Theorem  2.
The  relationship  hct  ccun  t ur.i-r;  I  '  v'.-  tlo"  ;is  ;  i  l-,  .'  :,.i  ,,
*.  ,  r  i.rl  cheory  studied  the  previous  section  is  given  by  the  followiig
result.
!  I  ;t  ;  ..  Il  l  t  K.:  ,  J  . i  '  ,  f  I  '  -
tl  i,,i.  l  i.;sp rle  nt:ltion  collapses  to
the  atemporal  vN-N utility.  This  is
the  case  if  .lni(  orl]"  i!,  in ;!,(iri  in  t-
is- :*  A  .i.  i;.  I  LI  t).- 
ic  ,al  - (it  - ai  )  ..  I  a(,;<p)  - ( L -a)(,Oi.),
where 1 is  the  equivalence  derived  from  R  in  the  usual  way.
Proof:  Kreps and  Porteus,  1978,  Theorem 3
and  its  corollary.
Thus,  the kinds  of  analyses usually undertaken  in  the  literature of
option  value, where atemporal vN-I  utility  is  assumed,  can  be  extended
without  modification  if  preferences satisfy  the  substitutiorn  ;i:il:  s  and
are  neutral  to  the  resolution  of  uncertainty.  However,  it  seens  unlikely
that  individuals are  neutral  with  respect  to  the  resolution  of  uncertainty.
Consicer  now  the  induced  preference  problem  and  the  relationship
between the  timing of  choices  of  CO and  the  tining  of  the  resolution  of-34-
uncertainty.  As  mentioned  above,  induced  preference  generally  will  not
have  an  expected  utility  representation.  In  fact,  it  generally  will not
have  a  temporal  vN-t1  representation.  Kreps  and  Porteus  (1979)  derive  necess-
ary  and  sufficient  conditions  for  the  former  to  take  on  the  latter  form.
Note  that  in  the  above  formulation,  the  first-period  consumption
decision  was  not  explicitly  introduced.  At  date  zero,  after  observing  the
outcome  of  the  temporal  lottery  pi,  the  agent  chooses  C(  from  B(.),  the
budget  set.  Note  that  it  is  possible  to  have  uncertainty  enter  the
buc',,t  Set  (via  income  or  price  uncertainty),  so  that  the  constraint  set
for  time  zero  decisions  depends  on  the  realization  of  the  date  zero  lottery,
as  long  as  it  does  so  continuously.
In  the  previous  section,  the  conditions  of  Theorem  5.1  were  stated
assuming  q0  fixed.  Alternatively,  it  could  be  assumed  that  the  individual
chooses  (C 0,C1) after  observing  the  outcome  of  (q o ql).  I  now  uncouple
these.  Continue  to  assume  preferences  representable  by  the  expectation
of  the  continuous  vN-M  function  V:  QO  x  Q1  x  B +  E, just  as  in  Section  V.
Here,  however,  after  observing  qu,  the  agent  chooses  C)  to  maximize
*
fQ  (Q ) V(qO,ql,CO,Cl ) d  1l'
The  following  states  standard  properties  of  value  functions.
Lemma  6.2:  V*  :  Q0  x  D 1 + E  defined  by
V*(qo,pl)  =  sup  fQ1  V(O,lC  C')d  Pl
C(eB(.  )  (')  V(o o
is  continuous,  the  supremum  is  attained,
and  C*:  Q(  x  D1 +  B  is  continuous.
Proof:  The  proof  is  a  fairly  tedious  restatement
of  results  from  the  dynamic  programming
literature  (see  Kreps  and  Porteus  (1 97 9a))
and  not  reproduced  here.-35-
Induced preference can  now be edfined  on DO by
R0 11  if fQ(Q)  V*(q 0 , 1) d 0 >  SQl(n)  > v* (q0o,1) d po
Lemma 6.3:  R0 is  asymmetric, negatively  transitive,
continuous,  and satisfies  the substitution
axiom for  t =  0.
Proof:  Kreps and  Porteus  (1979)  Proposition 2.
Thus,  induced preference satisfies axioms  6.1  to  6.3,  and by Theorem 6.1,
induced preference is  temporal vN-M if  axiom 6.4  holds,  i.e.,  if the
substitution axiom holds  for  t =  1.  The  following results  follow from
Kreps  and Porteus  (1979).
Theorem 6.3:  Induced  preference  is  atemporal vN-
if  and  only if,  for  all
1l and 1',  C (1p) =C (pi).
1  0  1
Proof:  By Kreps  and Porteus  (1979)  Lemma 1,
the C* : QO  x  D1 +  B given by
C*(q0,'1) =  arg max  V(qo,ql,,W1,CW  CoCl)dBl,
C0 E  B(-)
is  an  upper-semicontinuous  correspondence.
By Proposition 2 and  Corollary 1, induced
preference  is  atemporal vN-M  if  and  only  if
C*(qol)  n  C*(q,p 1 ) =  0.  Theorem 6.3
follows  from  this  result  and  the  fact  that
C*(qO,  p1)  is  singleton-valued under the
assumption of  that  upper and  lower contour
sets on Do under R are  strictly  convex sets.
Theorem 6.4:  Induced preference  is  temporal  vN-M  if  and
only if
(i) (qo 0,l)  I (q0,i)  implies  C*(q0,p)  =
C*(qo,  p1)
(ii)  (q 0 ,ul)  R (qo,11) implies  (qo, a1  +
(1 - a)p1)  R (qOil) for all a e (0,1).-36-
Proof:  Kreps  and Porteus  (1979),  Proposition 4
provide a statement  for  non-singleton C*.
The  result  is  immediate.
These  results  are  quite  strong  and  not  easily  checked.  Sufficient  con-
ditions take  the  form of  a restriction  on  the  form of  the utility  function.
The  following result  generalizes  one  in Kreps and Porteus  (1979).
Theorem 6.5:  Suppose  that
V(qo  q1, w* 0 W,  Co, c 1)  =  41(qo, co )  +
42 (qo'  C0 o)  3(qo  q1 '  c1),  let
U1 (qo  q1,'  Co) - 3  and  let  uo(q,  8)
E  max  +1  + 42(j)B for 8 E  T(q),  where
c  eB
0
T (q)  = {  e  E:  E  =  l( ) 3 (.)d 1 for U  e  D}.
Then if  oi  is  strictly  increasing  in  8,
induced preference  is  temporal  vN-l1  with
U1 and o0  representing induced preference.
Proof:  It  suffices  to  verify  the  substitution
axiom for t  =1;  the  result  then follows
from Theorem 6.1.  This  is  obvious from
the  fact  that  V  is  linear and  increasing
in 8 and a  is  linear  in  p1.  By hypothesis,
max(4 1 +  42  B(u1))  - max  (41 +  2B(.i))>).  But,
max  [n  1+  I2  (a[ +(l-a)i))]-[max(4 1+p 25(({+(l-a)i  )]
=  max(4 1 +  u2 acB(u 1)  +  42(1  - a)(p1)
- max(l 1 +  4d  ac(p{)  - (j(1  - a0()
=  max( 1 +  i 2 aB(,1))  - max(4[ +  c  a(i(p)  > 0.
While this  condition  is  straightforward, it  is  restrictive.  Kreps
and Porteus  (1979)  develop an approximation to  induced  preference which  is
temporal vN-M,  but  do not  claim  that  theirs  is  a  "best"  approximation  in  any
sense.  Machina  (1982,  1984)  makes  use  of  "generalized expected utility
theory," which does  make use  of  a best  approximation under  the assumption
that  induced preferences are  Frechet differential.-37-
Before  embarking on this  approximation procedure,  let us  summarize
what  the  issues  are.  The  agent  is assumed  to  have  a vN-M  utility function
defined  on  (q 0,  CO,  al,  C1).  When C1 is  chosen, everything  else  is known.
Maximizing out C1 provides  the  function V(q(,  ql,  CO).  Given  some q0,  the
distribution on  ql  is known, based on  the  function  f.  First period  consump-
tion CO is  chosen  after qo  is  observed,  but  before ql  is.  Thus,  one  can  use
Co(q 0,  Fl(ql  q0 )) as  this  optimal  choice  and  define
V(q)  =  JV(q 0 ,  q  ,.  C*(q(,  F1(q 1 |  q()))dlI 1 (q 1 ().
Overall  rankings  of  temporal  lotteries F0 on (!()  x D  are  made  on  the  basis
of  J(Fo)  =  f  (qo)  dF°(qO).
Now, it  is  clear  that preferences  on  temporal  lotteries  are  linear in
the probabilities  given  by  F  . However, the  induced preferences  on  F1 are
not  linear  in  the  probabilities;  Kreps  and  Porteus  show  that  they  are  convex.
Machina's  (1982,  1984)  insight  uses  intuition  from  ordinary  calculus:  a
differential  of  a  non-linear  function  is  the  best  linear approximation to
that  function  at  that  point.  Thus,  the best  linear approximation  to  the
non-linear  preference  functional  is  provided  by  differentiation  provided  it
is  smooth.  The  appropriate  concept  of  differentiation  here  is  Frechet  differ-
entiation.
I begin the  application of  Machina's  analysis  to  the  option  value problem
by  converting the  above analysis  to  the  use of  distribution  functions.  For
i  i  A
each pj  b. there  is  a unique distribution  function F.  in  the  space D.  of
J1  J  Jl
distribution function on Q(2).  Endow  the  space D. with  the  weak  topology,
as with  the  space D..  Machina  uses  the  notion of  the Frechet  derivative of
the  value functional.  This  requires  that  one  define  a norm  on  the  space
Dj  =  {(F* - F) I  F,  F"  e  D.,  X  e  }.
Then the  following result  holds.-38-
Lemma 6.3:  The  topology  of weak  convergence  on D. is  induced  by
the L  metric
d(F,F*)  =  F*(q)  - F(q)  dq.
Proof:  tiachina  (1982),  Lemma  1.
The norm on AD.  is  then  |  X(F* -F)  X |  d (F,F*).  One can  now discuss  the
differentiability of  the  induced preference  functional
J(F 1 ) =  fQ ( a )  V(I  qC,  o(q ,F 1(ql4  oo))  dF  1(l  ao
Assume  that  J(F 1 )  is  once  Frechet  differentiable.  That  is,  assume  that
there  exists  a  continuous  linear  functional  t2  (*,F 1)  on  AD 1 such  that
lim  J(F*)  - J(F 1)  - ~(F1  - F1;  Fl)  =
IIY*  - F II  F  0  --- l---- ^  -^---IIF*  - F i 
Machina  (19b2)  shows  that  existence  of  p(.,  *)  implies  the existence  of  a local
0  s  1
utility  function 6(',  F1) such that  for  any  F1  and F1 e  D1
J(F)  - J(F)  =  (ql;  F7)  [dFl(gl |  q)  dFl(ql  q)  +  (F  - F1 .
where 0(-)  is a function  of  higher order  than  its  argument.  Thus,  the  difference
in  preference the functional  consists  of  a linear term plus  a higher order tern.
The linear  term  is  the  difference  in  the  expectation  of 9(.)  with respect  to
the  two  distributions.  Thus,  the  induced preference ordering takes  on  a local
expected  utility  representation.
These  local utility  functions  can  be  used  to  analyze  "large" changes  in
distributions by use  of  a path  integral.  Let  8 £  [0,1];  we  define the  path
{ (  ; a) I  e  [0,1]}  from  F° to FV  by F(.;  8)  =  Fv +  (1 - B)F ° . Then
V(F v ) - V(F ° )  is given  by  the  integral  of  dV(.;  8)  dB  as 8  runs  fronm  to  1.
Machina  (1982;  1984)  provides  a number  of useful  results  regarding  the
local  utility functions 0(°,.)  and  the  overall  rankings  of  temporal prospects
based  on  the  funcation J(o).  For example  if  all  local utility functions  are-39-
concave,  then overall  choices will exhibit  risk aversion.  Thus,  one would expect
results that  rely  solely on  risk aversion to  carry  over to  the generalized  case.
Unfortunately, this is not  so  for Bishop's  proof  of  the non-negativity of
supply-side option value.  The reason is  familiar:  establishing the  sign of
option value  for supply-side uncertainty requires  a singly  utility function.
Here,  the utility function  corresponding to  F  is  different than the utility
function corresponding to FV if F° and FV  are  sufficiently different.  Thus,  for
projects which significantly will  affect environmental quality, the  assumption
of  one utility  function cannot  be  used when there  is  temporal  risk.  Formally,
I state this  as
Theorem 6.6:  Under temporal ecological  risk, the  sign of  supply-
side option value  is  indeterminate,  if  F° and Fv
differ  "significantly."
The main result  of  this section, Theorem 6.6,  is  a negative  one.  The sign
of  supply-side option value  is  indeterminate when  risk is  temporal under con-
ditions  that  allow  its  determination when risk  is  timeless.  However, Machina
(1984)  derives a numberof useful results concerning monotonicity and  concavity
of  the induced utility function V(qo,q 1 C*(.))  and distributions  that  are ordered
by stochastic dominance or  differ by  increases  in risk.  I will  not  repeat  these
here;  the results generally  are not  surprising given that  most propositions  in
the  timeless setting  relying on risk aversion carry over to  the temporal  setting
if  all  of  the local utility functions  exhibit  risk aversion.  While many  of
Machina's  results  could rule  out  from consideration certain projects  in A, it  is
apparent  that  a total ordering on A generally would not  be  forthcoming based  on
these results.  For example,  if  a project  induces  a distribution which differs
by a mean preserving increase  in  risk from the distribution  induced  by v° , then
v P* v° never would hold if  individual  utility  functions  are concave  in q1. But
certainly most  projects of  interest will give  rise to  changes  in mean as  well as-40-
increases  or  decreases  in  risk.
Of  course, this  does not  mean that welfare evaluations  cannot  proceed
when individual's  face  temporal risk.  As with  the static option  price,  one
knows what one wishes  to  measure  and  one has  techniques  available, i.e.,  con-
tingent valuation methods,  to  obtain  it.  The  relevant measure is  EOP  defined by
J(F  (q),  w)  =  J(Fo(q),  w-EOP(F,  F  ,  w)),
0'  0  0
where J(F,  *) is defined  as  above  an alternative temporal  lotteries,  where
FV  is  the  temporal  lottery  induced  by  project v e  A and 0 e A is  the  "project"
which  is  defined by  the status-quo.  What  one  is  unable  to  obtain  in  this  frame-
work is  the sign  of  option  value.  This  seems  to  be  an elusive  quest.-41-
7.  Project Choice Under Uncertainty
As  in the  case of  certainty,  it  is  up  to  the  central planner  to  select a
project from A, based on individual willingness-to-pay  for them.  Three  issues
arise here.  First,  suppose that  there is  no planning uncertainty.  That  is,  the
planner is  able to  obtain EOP  (F ° ,  F ,  w) for each individual and  for each
v e  A.  The analysis  proceeds exactly as  in  Section 3;  based on  the weights  bi
of  the social welfare function,  the  planner selects v e A such  that  the weighted
EOP is  maximal,  after incorporating a feasible  financing scheme for  the project.
The second question that  arises  concerns  the  possibility  that  the planner's
preferences  can  be  formulated over  projects  such  that  the planner's  preferences
satisfy the  von Neumann-Morganstern axioms.  Clearly  this will  only be  the  case
if  individual utilities satisfy  these axioms.  Thus,  in  this  section I consider
a static model.  The answer  to  this  question, based  on Wilson's  (1968)  analysis
of  the theory  of  syndicates, demonstrates  the  appeal  of  the  linear welfare  func-
tion.  This  is  undertaken below.
The third question concerns  the assumption, maintained  throughout the  paper
so far,  that uncertainty  is  exogenous.  As  Bishop  (1982)  points  out,  there  is  a
connection between supply-side option  value and  the  literature on quasi-option
value  (Arrow and Fisher, 1974),  in which  learning may  take place.
Regarding  the question of project  selection, I now  incorporate into the
risky choice problem the financing decision, and  determine a relationship  bet-
ween group and  individual payoffs as  functions  of  the  project  and outcomes  of
the  random event.
Suppressing dependence of  a previous quality, if  project v e  A is imple-
mented and  event w e  S  obtains, realized environment quality  is  f(v,w).-42-
Individual  i's  assumed von Newmann-Morganstern utility function  is
Vi(q, w)  =  V  i(f(v,w)w)  and  equivalent  variation is  defined  by
V  (fuw)w  - ev  (V,a))  =  Vi(f(v,w),w).
As  in Section  3, under financing scheme s(v)  E  S(u),  i pays  s (v).  The  payoff
to person  i from implementation  of  project  v  is  m  (v,w) =  evi(v,W) - si(v).
Since environmental  quality  is  a public good,  the  group  payoff  from  imple-
menting project v  is
g(V,w)  =E  mi(v ,t) =  levi(v,w) - k(v).
i  i
To  develop  a  tie  to  the  linear  welfare  function  of  section  3,  begin  by  sup-
posing  that  the  planner  seeks  to  implement  a  financing  scheme  that  is Pareto
efficient.
Denote the  expected utility of  the  ith  agent  under project  v  by
fi  i  Ji(v,si(v),  Fi )
- fvi(f(v,), w  - s (v))dF  (w).
The standard  proofs of  the  following lemmata are  omitted.
Lemma 7.1:  The  set T(v)  defined  by T(v)  =  {Jl(v,s ,Fi):  s1 e  S(v)}
is  convex.
Lemma 7.2:  If  s(v)  is  Pareto efficient  then  there  is  a set  of
weights  {bi(v),  i =  1, ... ,  I} with  hi(v)  > 0 such
that  s(v)  solves
max  I  bi(v)  J(v,si(v),Fi(W).
s(v)ES(v)  i
The  following result  is  stated by Wilson  (1968).-43-
Theorem 7.1:  s(v)  is  Pareto efficient  if and only  if  there  exist
non-negative  weights  {b1(v)}  and  a function X(v,w)
such  that
(i)  s(v)  c S(v)
(ii)  b  v  (.)  hi(w)  = X(vw)  X  =  1,  ... ,  1
for almost all w C  Q for  which bi(v)hi(w)  > 0, where
h  =  Fi  (),  i.e.,  h  is  the density  corresponding  to
i's  subject probability measure  on w.
"Proof":  By Lemma 7.2  the planner wishes to  solve a constrained
minimization problem, with weights defined by  the
tangent hyperplane  to T(v).  This  hyperplane  exists by
Lemma  7.1.  The  function X(v,w)  can  be  thought  of  as
the Lagrange multiplier  in  the  constrained maximization
problem, where  the  constraint  is  given  by  (i).  Thus,
s(v)  and X(v,w)  can  be found  as  by  finding (pointwise)
a paddle-point  of  the  Lagrangean,  i.e.,  by  solving
sup  inf  L(bi Ji  hi,k)
s  X
where
L(X)  =  {  bi(v)V(f(v,w),w-si(V))hi(w)  - si(v)X(v,W)}
This  theorem  concerns  the  choice  of  a Pareto efficient financing  scheme.
The central question of  this  analysis  concerns  the  overall problem faced  by  the
planner, which  includes  the  choice  of  a feasible project.  The central question
is whether there exists  some overall utility function such  that,  in  choosing  a
Pareto efficient  project,  the planner will maximize  the expectation of  this
function.  The  answer to  this  question  is  stated  in  the next  proposition.
Theorem 7.2:  There exists  a group utility function V (q,w)  such




if  bi(v)  are  independent  of v.-44-
Proof:  Given Theoren  7.1,  the  overall problem is to  solve
sup f  inf  {Ak +  X  sup  [b i Vi hi - Xsi]}  dw.
veA  X  i  seS
Define  the  "rent" measure
i(d i ) - sup[Vi(q,x)  - d.x].
1
x
Then  the  above  probler  can  be  simplified  to  read
sup  f  inf  {It[b  hi i(  A .)]  - Xk}dw.
vEA  X  i  b'h 1
Define
V°(f(v,w),w,v) E  inf  {i  [bi(v)hi  pi(  X  ) - Xk}.
X  i  bilh 
Then  the  preferred  project  solves
sup  j  V  (f(v,W),w,v)dw.
VEA
This V° will  depend  on v only through  the  transition
equation  on environmental quality if  the weights
bi(v)  are  independent of  v.
The  theory  of  syndicates,  applied  here  to  the  analysis of  provision  of  a
public  good,  concerns  the  relationship  between  individual  preference  represen-
tations  and  group preference  representations.  The key result  is  that  if the
social welfare function  is  linear  (as  in Section  3),  then  there  is a "utility
function"  for  the planner such  that  choice of  efficient  projects  amounts  to
maximization of  the  expected  value  of  this  function.
It  is  important  to  note  that  the  only  source  of  uncertainty  in  the  model  is
ecological uncertainty.  There  is no  planning uncertainty  (in  the  language  of
Section 4) since  the planner  is  assumed  to  know  the  individual vN-M  utility
functions and  the  individual probability density  functions.  With  planning
uncertainty,  the planner does  not know these  individual preferences.-45-
The case of  pure planning uncertainty  raises a number of  interesting
problems  of  analysis.  The first  concerns  the form of  the planner's objective
function.  Anderson (1979)  has proposed that  planner's  preferences  in this
situation be assumed to  take an expected utility form.  This  approach might be
considered to be  controversial.  Second,  since uncertainty gives  rise to  possi-
bilities for  learning, there is  a possibility  that  the  planner can devise a
mechanism to discover  the  true preferences  of  individuals.  This  issue  is  the
topic of  the  large literature on  incentives.  That  is, can a principle  (in this
case  the planner) design an  incentive scheme which  induces  an agent  (individuals
in society who care  about  the project)  to  act  in accord wtih  the principle's
goals  (reveal  their preferences  for a public good).  The  theory  of  incentives
has  been reviewed recently  by Laffont and Maskin  (1982).  They study  par-
ticularly  simple forms  of  individual utility  functions  (quasi-linear) and
planner  choice  rules which are  similar  to  those posited here where  the indivi-
dual  "weights" are  the  same  for all individuals.  While it  appears  that  the
literature abounds with impossibility  theorems,  these  are  often seeking incen-
tive  schemes with quite strong properties.  It would seem possible for  the
planner to  learn something  of  individual preferences which will be  of  use.
The  third issue is  that  raised by  the  literature on  quasi-option value.
Until now, all of  the timing of  resolution of uncertainty relative  to  the  timing
of choices  in  projects and  consumption has  been assumed exogenous.  The QOV
literature seeks  to  deduce  the  effect  of  possibilities for  learning  on
willingness  to undertake  projects which are  irreversible.
In terms  of  the current model,  let A = A  x A1,  where At =  [0,1].  Suppose
that  Int At
= for t = 0,1,  and  that  projects are  irreversible  in that
v  = 1 => v  = 1, while v  = 0 is  consistent with v  = 0 or  = 1.  The QOV
literature  then compares  two decision  frameworks.  In one  framework it  is-46-
assumed that  no new information will  become available.  Thus,  the planner
chooses  immediately  from A one  of  (0,0),  (0,1)  or  (1,1).  In  the  other  decision
scheme  a sequential  decision is  possible, i.e.,  conditional on  vo, and  the  out-
come  of  an experiment  y s  Y that  provides information,  the  planner chooses
*  *
v1 (Voy). Clearly, if v  =  1, then v1 =  1 irrespective of  the  outcome  of  the
*
experiment.  However, if  v  = 0, then  vl  (U,y) is  undertaken.  Using a backward
induction approach,  the  optimal choise of  v  can  be determined  based on a like-
lihood  function for  the experiment.  Provided  the  information service Y has
value  (increases expected payoff)  the  central result  of  the  QOV  literature is
that,  if v* = (1,1)  is  optimal in  the  non-sequential decision  framework,  it may
*
be  that v  = 0  is  optimal  in  the  sequential decision framework.  The  difference 0
in  expected payoff with V  = 1 in  the non-secuential and  sequential  cases  is
QoV.
This  result  is  intiutively  plesing and  corresponds  to Nlachina's  (1984)
observation  that  an  individual never will  prefer a temporal  prospect  to  an  iden-
tically distributed  timeless one.  In  the context  of  the  current  model,  it
appears  that merely  observing the  outcome qo  constitutes learning since  the  pro-
bability distribution  on  ql  is  conditioned  on  the outcome  ao due  to  the  nature
of  the  transition equation f.  Thus,  learning here  can be  passive  and  involves
no cost.  Of  more  interest, since  this  surely will  be  recognized  by  a planner
and  built  into  the sequential decision framework,  is  the  possibility of  actively
learning about which  f e D  is  the  true  ecological process  function.  An  experi-
ment which involves  this  additional source  of  learning would  be  sufficient  for
passive  observation  of  q . This  would give  rise  to an  additional source  of  QOV.
Mluch  of  the analysis  in the  QOV  literature assumes  that  Int  At = C,  as
above.  Graham-Torasi  (1983)  presents a model of  pure  planning uncertainty-47-
for  the case At =  [0,1]  in which  the concept  of  "quasi-option tax"  (QOT) is  pre-
sented.  Although his  model is  very  different than  that considered here and so
the details of  the analysis  are not  relevant, QOT  is  an adjustment to  initial
development benefits  in  the  learning  case that  would lead  to  the  same  level of
initial development  as  in  the non-sequential case.  Moreover, QOT  is  a poten-
tially  estimable number,  given bythe expected  present  value of  the  second  period
loss  if  an irreversible  decision is  implemented at  the  myopically profitable
level, where the  loss  is  averaged over  the  possible states of  nature under which
the  decision-maker would reverse  the decision  if  he/she  could.-48-
8.  Discussion
In this  paper, I have attempted to explore  the foundations  of  supply-side
option value and project  appraisal under uncertainty.  The key  result  is the
following:  when temporal risk is  present,  the  analysis  of  option prices  and
option values significantly  is  complicated.  Since almost  all situations
discussed in the  option value literature  involve temporal risk,  the analyses  of
this  literature seriously are  called  into question.  However, this  is  not  really
a significant  insight  since most  of  the analyses  of  option value have  a negative
result:  option value  is  not  determinate  in sign.  The key  insight for  the ana-
lytical option value  literature is  the  following:  existing studies  in which
positive  results have been obtained, e.g.,  Bishop's  (1982)  result  on supply-side
option value  and our  own Theorem 5.6  in  the  same area,  no  not hold  in an  obvious
way under temporal risk.  As well, Freeman's  (1984) and  Smith's  (1984)  bounds  on
option value would need  to  be  reexamined under temporal risk using an extension
of Machina's  (1984)  generalized expected utility  analysis to  the  case  of  state
dependent preferences.  An alternative  is  the use  of  the  restriction  of  Kreps
and Porteus  (1979)  to obtain  temporal von Neumann-Morgenstern utility  represen-
tations.  The use  of  atemporal vN-M representations undoubtedly  is  too strong.
Another  alternative  to  all  of  these machinations  is  to explicitly model  the
intervening choices,  as  in Dreze and Modigliani  (1972).  This  is  the  approach
taken in  the QOV literature.  While a complete analysis  along these  lines  is
likely  to  result  in too much deatil so  that  analytical tractability  is lost,  for
some  decisions  (or under separability assumptions)  this  may prove  useful.
Regarding empirical studies,  it is  clear that  the use  of  contingent
valuation techniques  to measure option  price  holds  the key  to  correct project
appraisal under uncertainty.  It  may turn out  that empirical  regularities  exist.
My own feeling  is  that  this will not  be  the  case,  and such  an approach  is-49-
similar to  the search for  a single discount  rate  for use in  the analysis  of
public projects.  It  is  likely  that  decisions will  differ sufficiently  that
regularities will not  exist.
Regarding the  conduct  of  these empirical studies  to determine option
prices,  two important  points emerge.  When setting  the  context  of  the questions
in  the  survey,  it  is  curcial that  respondents understand  the  temporal aspects of
the  choices  being made.  Inadequate attention has  been given  to this  issue  in
existing studies.  Can individuals  change their minds?  Will a reassessment be
made as  learning  takes place?  Need  payments  be equal annual  payments,  or  can
WTP  lump-sum payments  be  allocated through  time in  any fashion?
A second point  concerns the existence of  local utility functions.  The uti-
lity functions depend on initial probabilities and  on  all probabilities  in a
global analysis.  This may  prove  to  be  important  in  teh assessment procedure,
particularly regarding specification bias  in  regressions explaining willingness-
to-pay.
While the overall  results of  this  paper seem quite negative, this  is not
the  acutal  intent of  the  analysis.  Rather, it  is  to  suggest  that  much work
remains  to  be  done.  But,  this  is  not  surprising given  the difficulty of
analyses  involving both  time and  risk.-50-
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